

ANALYSIS OF  
DIS/AGREEMENT –  
with particular reference to  
Law and Legal Theory

by

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# Contents

An asterisk after an item means that the section concerned is introduced with a table of contents of its own

<i>Preface to the English edition</i> .....	vii
<i>Preface to the Norwegian edition</i> .....	ix
<i>Some symbols and conventions used in the text</i> .....	xx

## **I INTRODUCTION**

1. First formulation of major aims and main threads.....	3
2. Propositions about what something is .....	5
3. Fundamental proposition-types and ambiguities .....	7
4. A critically reflexive mode of questioning as a remedy. – Language users’ implementation of a relatively well-delimited critically reflexive form: the fundamental types of proposition with further nuancing and combinations. – The existence level of the critically reflexive form: the aspect of discussion and decision in language and argumentation .....	9
5. Survey. Guidance for the reader .....	13
5.1. Survey of the content of the work. The generality of the critically reflexive form.....	13
5.2. Guidance for the reader with a view to law and legal theory. The fundamental significance of the critically reflexive form for lawyers’ power of judgement .....	15
6. The status of the present work’s own propositions. The independence of the critically reflexive form.....	18
7. The shadow existence, in theoretical respects, of the critically reflexive form. The value of the present work.....	22
8. Summary of the main aim of the present work.....	24

CONTENTS

**II SOME FUNDAMENTAL TYPES OF PROPOSITION  
ABOUT WHAT SOMETHING IS**

<b>A SURVEY</b> .....	27
1. Introduction.....	27
2. Definitions; analytically un/true propositions; characterisations. Possibility and desirability of distinguishing. – “What is meaning?” .....	28
3. The structuring function and naming function of definitions .....	38
4. Specification of connotation and specification of denotation.....	40
5. Descriptive propositions; normative propositions; fusions. In particular on the broad meaning of the term “normative proposition” .	42
6. The distinctions between the types of proposition lie by definition on the level of meaning, in contrast to the level of language. The way the word “meaning” etc. is used in what follows.....	50
7. Summary of fundamental types of proposition about what something is. The main emphasis of the present work .....	53
8. Non-empirical propositions .....	55
<b>B DEFINITIONS</b> .....	56
1. Why definition theory?*	56
2. Introductory remarks on my concept of ‘definition’ .....	62
2.1. Formed out of the desire for insight into analysis and argumentation occurring in fact and formulated in everyday language: including law and legal theory* .....	62
2.2. Contrast: Normative cognition interests in philosophy and logic ....	66
2.3. The unity and the diversity in the concept. Terminology .....	72
3. Modality of definitions I: Descriptivity and normativity.....	76
3.1. Introduction. Modality and propositional content .....	76
3.2. Descriptive definitions.....	82
3.2.1. Definition and types .....	82
3.2.2. The presupposed concept of ‘concept’. Condition concept. Factor concept; especially on family resemblance. Consequences for the method of definition* .....	83
3.3. Normative definitions .....	103
3.3.1. Stipulated normative definitions* .....	104
3.3.2. Custom-based normative definitions* .....	110
3.3.3. Hybrid forms of and interplay between stipulations and customs* .....	114
3.3.4. Normative-traditional and normative-innovative definitions .....	119

CONTENTS

3.3.5. Normative definitions and family resemblance.....	120
3.3.6. Statutory definitions* .....	121
3.4. The distinction dimensions in what follows (sections 4–6) are (also) means for stating more precisely the area of application of the distinction between descriptivity and normativity in the case of definitions .....	125
4. The propositional content of definitions: What is being defined.....	126
4.1. The structuring function of definitions. More on the presupposed concept of ‘concept’* .....	126
4.2. The naming function of definitions* .....	145
4.3. The significance of the distinction between the structuring function and the naming function of definitions.....	161
4.3.1. Whether, and if so to what extent, definitions have the one, the other or both functions. Interplay .....	161
4.3.2. Whether the functions are exercised descriptively or normatively .....	162
4.3.3. Whether the functions are exercised normative- traditionally or normative-innovatively. Criteria for “the same definition question”* .....	163
4.3.4. Other connections in which the distinction is of significance .....	171
4.4. The significance of definitions’ mode of formulation .....	171
4.4.1. Two main modes: Word terminology and concept terminology. Survey of the significance of the mode of formulation .....	171
4.4.2. The modes of formulation are in practice often used to express the same definition-functional content .....	173
4.4.3. Concept terminology gives the impression of greater unity and objectivity than word terminology .....	176
4.4.4. Concept terminology is more difficult to put to the test than word terminology .....	178
5. Means of structuring I.....	179
5.1. Connotation specification .....	179
5.2. Denotation specification* .....	182
5.3. Combination.....	193
5.4. The role of the means in relation to one another in actually occurring definition activity.....	195
5.4.1. The definition product* .....	196
5.4.2. In particular on the role of denotation specifications in lawyers’ definitions; “instance-type propositions” and statutory definitions* .....	200

## CONTENTS

5.4.3. The psychological process prior to the definition product. Subsequent linguistic practice.....	217
5.5. Structuring via a more comprehensive language context.....	219
6. Means of structuring II: Means of specifying the connotation.....	222
6.1. Purely cognitive criteria or evaluation prescription*.....	222
6.2. Factors or conditions*.....	229
7. Normative definitions as means to influencing action; “persuasive definitions”.....	239
7.1. Introduction.....	239
7.2. Interplay between words, emotions and things.....	240
7.3. Persuasive definitions.....	244
7.3.1. Definition and two main types*.....	244
7.3.2. Examples.....	249
(1) “Legal/ Science”.....	249
(2) “Norm”.....	256
(3) “Meaning”.....	260
(4) “Law”, “right”, “rule of law” and “legal safeguards” [Rechtssicherheit].....	260
7.3.3. Some characteristic features of persuasive definitions.....	260
8. The modality of definitions II: Dimensions, degrees, fusion.....	265
8.1. The distinction between descriptivity and normativity can in the case of definitions relate to different dimensions.....	265
8.2. The strength of normative definitions; dimensions and degrees*....	266
8.3. The distinction between descriptivity and normativity is itself graduated: See section F on fusion of descriptive and normative propositions.....	267
9. Taking a critically reflexive turn. The definition theory applied to the definition theory.....	268
<b>C CHARACTERISATIONS.....</b>	<b>270</b>
1. Introduction; survey of topics concerning characterisations that are discussed in this work.....	270
2. Non-empirical characterisations.....	272
2.1. Descriptive*.....	272
2.2. Normative.....	277
2.3. “Essential definition”.....	278
3. The strength of characterisations.....	281
3.1. The strength of descriptive characterisations*.....	281
3.2. The strength of normative characterisations.....	286

<b>D ANALYTICALLY UN/TRUE PROPOSITIONS</b> .....	287
1. Introduction.....	287
2. The boundary with definitions .....	288
3. The boundary with characterisations .....	289
4. Excursus on terminology used of analytically un/true propositions.....	291
<b>E SEPARATING</b> .....	293
1. Introduction.....	293
1.1. Why is it, in addition to the discussion above, necessary to discuss how one decides which type of proposition one is confronted with in the individual instance? .....	293
1.2. The status of, the main threads in and the purposes of the further discussion.....	294
2. How does one decide which proposition type one is confronted with in the individual instance? .....	296
2.1. Meaning according to widespread linguistic practice, especially according to custom-based normative definitions (“objective interpretation/ meaning”) .....	296
2.1.1. The concept .....	296
2.1.2. Some features of custom-based definitions that make possible difference and interplay between objective meaning and subjective meaning.....	297
2.2. Sender’s meaning or a particular person’s understanding (“subjective interpretation/ meaning”) .....	299
2.2.1. The concept .....	299
2.2.2. May coincide with, innovate, supplement, make more precise, or break with objective meaning.....	300
2.2.3. May be actual or hypothetical. In particular on the use of the hypothetical variant*.....	300
2.2.4. May be sought through the language user’s propositions about what he means himself or through the language user’s behaviour. In particular concerning reaction to phenomena that do not have the property the proposition formulation specifies, as a criterion of proposition type* .....	303
2.2.5. In what relations and in what sense is subjective meaning “psychological”? Similarity with and difference from objective meaning. In particular on definiteness of intention .....	308
2.3. Particular problems as a result of “flight from the normative proposition” .....	310

CONTENTS

<b>F FUSION OF DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE PROPOSITIONS. THE CONCEPTS OF ‘DESCRIPTIVE PROPOSITION’ AND ‘NORMATIVE PROPOSITION’ AS CONCEPTS OF DEGREE</b> .....	312
1. Introductory remarks on my concept of ‘fusion’. Terminology .....	312
2. Lawyers’ propositions de lege lata as the paradigm case .....	316
2.1. Fused modality in connection with a general descriptive component: “What opinion other lawyers will probably hold”* .....	317
2.2. Drawing the boundary with descriptive propositions about particular sources-of-law facts and “wishful thinking” in the genesis of such propositions .....	325
2.3. The perspective of “the generalised lawyer” .....	327
3. More on the concept of ‘fusion’ and its consequences for the distinction between descriptive and normative propositions .....	329
3.1. The concepts of ‘descriptive proposition’ and ‘normative proposition’ as concepts of degree.....	329
3.2. Contrasting of fusion with some other phenomena .....	332
3.2.1. Drawing the boundary with the graduated distinction between normative-traditional and normative-innovative propositions .....	332
3.2.2. Drawing the boundary with evaluation prescription in the connotations of concepts and, as the case may be, evaluation-free language attire* .....	334
3.2.3. Drawing the boundary with persuasive definitions .....	344
3.2.4. Drawing the boundary with indeterminacy .....	344
3.2.5. Drawing the boundary with lack of knowledge on the part of the recipient.....	346
3.2.6. Drawing boundaries with structures in language, morals and the relationship between parents and children.....	347
4. Forms of expression, within the framework of lawyers’ language and argumentation de lege lata.....	349
4.1. Not direct expression through individual words, but indirect showing through patterns of argumentation .....	349
4.2. Independent of forms of expression of evaluation prescription .....	350
<b>G NO CORRESPONDING FUSION OF DEFINITIONS AND CHARACTERISATIONS</b> .....	352
1. A difference in the use of the ‘descriptive proposition–normative proposition’ dimension and the ‘definition–characterisation’ dimension.....	352



2. The relationship between the present work and Quine’s critique of distinctions that build on a boundary between linguistic meaning and other sources of knowledge*.....	354
<b>H INTERPLAY</b> .....	367
 <b>III TOPICS FROM THE ASSESSMENT OF TENABILITY</b>	
1. Introduction.....	371
2. Criteria that are used in the setting up of and choice between normative definitions .....	373
2.1. Point of departure: A more complex evaluation than in the case of descriptive definitions. Aim: A mapping of certain general features of the motive situation .....	373
2.2. The structuring.....	374
2.2.1. (Formal) logical criteria.....	374
2.2.2. Operationalisability* .....	378
2.2.3. References to “expediency”, “fruitfulness”, “the purpose”, or the like. The necessity for further specifications .....	388
2.2.4. Cognition .....	391
2.2.5. Influencing action.....	395
2.2.6. Aesthetic and heuristic considerations* .....	397
2.2.7. Content of structuring and way of structuring.....	408
2.3. The naming .....	409
2.4. The coupling of area and name.....	410
2.4.1. Heuristic considerations .....	410
2.4.2. Concealed action influencing .....	415
2.5. Limits to the motivational weight of the above-mentioned considerations: Custom. Chance.....	418
2.5.1. The content of the structuring and of the naming .....	418
2.5.2. The way of defining.....	419
2.5.3. The ways in which custom works .....	419
3. Criteria that are used in the setting up of and choice between descriptive characterisations .....	421
3.1. The topic. Point of departure: The truth criterion. “Thou shalt not lie!” .....	421
3.2. Normative propositions that set true characterisations aside or increase the probability of untrue characterisations .....	423
3.2.1. Everyday life .....	423
3.2.2. Politics .....	424

CONTENTS

3.2.3. Law .....	426
3.2.4. Science.....	432
4. Lawyers' propositions de lege lata: a complex tenability assessment.....	436

**IV SOME FORMS OF LANGUAGE AND ARGUMENTATION  
THAT OFTEN MAKE IT UNCLEAR WHICH TYPE OF  
PROPOSITION ONE IS CONFRONTED WITH;  
IN PARTICULAR ON THE FLIGHT FROM  
THE NORMATIVE PROPOSITION**

1. Survey .....	443
2. Use of polysemous modes of expression in the case of evaluations and choices.....	444
2.1. The concept. The topic: A factual tendency in the case of evaluations and choices: use of modes of expression that are polysemous between the descriptive, logical and normative.....	444
2.2. Some modes of expression that are systematically polysemous between the descriptive, logical and normative* .....	446
3. Use of descriptive or logical modes of expression in the case of evaluations and choices .....	458
3.1. The concept. The topic: A factual tendency in the case of evaluations and choices: use of descriptive or logical modes of expression.....	458
3.2. Patterns from language and argumentation more generally* .....	460
3.3. Patterns more specific to lawyers' language and argumentation de lege lata .....	464
3.3.1. The pervasive descriptive way of expressing oneself* .....	464
3.3.2. On principle terminology in particular .....	475
(1) Introduction .....	475
(2) Positive law aspects .....	476
(3) "Natural law" aspects* .....	478
(4) Unity: hiding evaluations and choices .....	483
3.3.3. On linking-terms in particular .....	483
3.3.4. Lawyers' language and argumentation de lege lata as a double abstraction: From the legal-consequence side of linking-terms. And from evaluations and choices .....	486

<b>V RECONSTRUCTION AND REDEFINITION: A DISTINCT AND WIDESPREAD COMBINATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITION TYPES</b>	
1. ‘Reconstruction and redefinition’ – a concept of degree .....	491
1.1. Definition* .....	491
1.2. The purpose of my conceptualisation: mapping (describing) what one dis/agrees about .....	498
2. Propositions about what legal phenomena are, interpreted as reconstructions and redefinitions .....	499
2.1. Introduction .....	499
2.2. “Løfte” [promise]; “Viljeserklæring” [declaration of intent]; “Rettsandel” [juristic act] .....	499
2.3. “Legalitetsprinsippet” [the principle of legality] .....	501
2.4. “The constructed ratio decidendi of the judgment” .....	502
2.5. “Law” .....	509
2.6. “Valid law” .....	511
3. Comparison with some related concepts of modes of analysis .....	513
3.1. Introduction .....	513
3.2. Næss: ‘Real definition’* .....	514
3.3. Carnap .....	518
3.3.1. ‘Explication’* .....	518
3.3.2. ‘Rational reconstruction’* .....	523
3.3.3. Others’ use of Carnap’s terms .....	529
3.4. Goodman, Rawls: ‘Reflective equilibrium’* .....	532
3.5. The graduated transitions to significant differences .....	536
4. Tenability assessment and causal perspective .....	539
4.1. The assessment of tenability; a function of the unity of several sets of criteria .....	539
4.2. Causal perspective; some factors that may contribute to explaining tendencies in the direction of reconstructions and redefinitions .....	540
4.2.1. Explanation of social phenomena versus explanation of natural phenomena .....	540
4.2.2. Normatively regulated denotation* .....	541
5. A more general structure .....	546
 <b>I↔V CONCLUSION</b> .....	 549
<b>Literature referred to</b> .....	557
<b>Index of authors</b> .....	592
<b>Index of subjects</b> .....	599